Materialising Memory: The Public Lives of Roadside Crash Shrines

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Abstract

This is a study in two parts. First I explore the containment and effervescence of traumatic memory in roadside crash shrines, vernacular memorial assemblages built by private individuals at sites where family or friends have died in automobile accidents. Secondly I suggest that the ongoing production of spaces of mourning not only materialises memory, but the limits of memory. This article enters into the vigorous critical and theoretical dialogues within visual and material culture and memory studies surrounding contemporary discourses of trauma, memory, and space. It also analyses a set of shrines I have recursively photographed for the past eight years in the US. Each of these shrines has grown and contracted over time, not only because of changes made by those who maintain them, but also because of the specific climate and weather phenomena they encounter on the roadside. Some objects disperse. Others are replaced. Others fade. Others decay. I argue that these shrines transfer the life lost in an automobile crash to the life lived by the memory objects and spaces contained within them. These spaces and objects then act as a proxy for the absent victim as the shrine takes on a life of its own, alternately reinforcing and eliding discontinuities of time in the production of memory/space. Especially when shrine objects decay, that first transference of body to object is further materialised. This reveals that the shrine as memory/space is not only living, but also dying all over again, there on the roadside.

Keywords: public memory, transference, material culture, trauma, automobility
Roadside crash shrines are vernacular memorial assemblages built at sites where people have died in automobile accidents, either while driving cars or motorcycles, or being hit by cars or motorcycles as pedestrians, cyclists, or motorcyclists. Prevalent for decades in Latin America and the south-western U.S., they are now seen throughout the country and around the world. Because crash shrines are produced by multiple people at multiple moments in time, they can bring together an extraordinary juxtaposition of signifying objects, images, and practices. Yet somehow they seem to cohere materially, visually, and spatially not only into powerfully sanctified spaces central to processes of working through road trauma, but also as a distinctive form of public memory. This is because they are immediately recognisable, even to strangers who witness them while driving by at highway speeds.

As scholars from a number of different disciplines studying roadside crash shrines have established, their primary function is to create a performative space for mourning and a potential warning to other drivers who encounter them. What is not established, however, is an understanding of the processes by which these mourning and warning functions work for both strangers and intimates at particular sites.

It is also not clear how these functions are embedded within the larger dynamics between individual and collective memories of trauma currently observed in the U.S. For the last eight years, I have been traveling the roads of the south-western U.S. doing mobile fieldwork at the sites of roadside crash shrines. I am working on a book project that addresses this gap by situating crash shrines within a dynamic of interlocking contemporary discourses—trauma, memory, and automobility. I have found that individual acts of road trauma, memorialising road trauma, and experiencing other people’s acts of memorialising road trauma all mirror each other as they intersect on the road.

In this article I explore the key concepts of memory, space, temporality, materiality, and transference to analyse the containment and effervescence of traumatic memory in roadside crash shrines. I then suggest that the ongoing production of spaces of mourning not only materialises memory, but also the limits of memory. I argue that these shrines materialise memory by transferring the life lost in an automobile crash to the life lived by the shrine itself on the roadside.

These memory/spaces then act as a proxy for the absent victim as the shrine takes on a life of its own in the public right-of-way. When shrine objects eventually decay, that first transference of absent body to present object is further materialised, revealing that the shrine as memory/space is not only living, but also dying all over again, in public. How that living and dying works, and what it means for contemporary public memory and culture in the U.S., is the subject of this article.
Roadside crash shrines as contained memory

These shrines take shape within a particular memory culture present today. Likewise, their study is located at the convergence of strong movements within contemporary academic discourse. In Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates, Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz argue that “although the contemporary ‘presentness’ of memory is evident” in media, politics, and the academy, there are “many divergent currents” articulated in attempts to understand the prevalence of memory in public discourse today.²

Shrines, in particular, demand a theoretical framework and methodology that reaches beyond any one discipline to encompass ways of seeing and doing scholarship that can account for their complex shapes. My work in this area is thus located at the convergence of many interdisciplinary “turns” in contemporary scholarship—visual, spatial, material, and affective—that engage non-representational and extra-linguistic cultural forms with what Victor Buchli calls a multi-sensory approach to “the phenomenological and somatic effects” of visual, material, and spatial culture “beyond textuality”.³

Memory works at multiple scales of individual and social life and is simultaneously a thing and a process. Making sense of memory is extraordinarily complex; making sense of the interrelationship between individual and group memory is therefore even more difficult. Theorists in the interdisciplinary field of memory studies have generated multiple taxonomies of group memory, each with its own set of definitions and commitments: collective memory, cultural memory, social memory, public memory, post-memory, and prosthetic memory.

All seek to describe and theorise intersubjective, extrasomatic forms of memory located outside of any one individual where social relations, cultural discourses, and material constraints intervene even more strongly than they do within individual memories. At stake is not only understanding that individual memories are different from group memories, but also how they interrelate. As Barbara Misztal puts it, “while it is an individual who remembers, his or her memory exists, and is shaped by…what has been shared with others”. Moreover, collective memory is also “always memory of an intersubjective past, of a past lived in relation to other people” within a particular social and cultural context.⁴

How these memories are shared and that process is materialised within the spaces where memory is performed is a question that needs to be answered. It is best asked not in the abstract but, as Radstone and Schwarz also advocate, while “working close to the ground”, where we can analyse “historically specific formations of remembering and forgetting” where we find them, situated within their historical, cultural, and material contexts.⁵ Thus my goal here is to theorise while staying close to the ground. Within the space of this article, the words and photographs play off each other as I enter into critical and theoretical dialogues within memory studies surrounding contemporary discourses of trauma, memory, and space. This is to show how shrines work as material and spatial forms to produce a particular kind of public memory.⁶
Roadside crash shrines are part of a wider worldwide phenomenon: something that Jack Santino calls “spontaneous shrines”. With roots reaching deeply and widely through many different cultural traditions, these shrines aim to “make sense of senseless deaths”, where the deaths are “unanticipated violent deaths of people who do not fit into categories of those we expect to die, who may be engaging in routine activities in which there is a reasonable expectation of safety”. The fact that these shrines are located not in cemeteries where accident victims are ultimately buried or cremated but within those spaces of everyday life where the unexpected deaths occurred—on roadsides, sidewalks, fences, buildings etc—is critical to their functioning. Santino argues that spontaneous shrines “insert and insist upon the presence of absent people”; they “place deceased individuals back into the fabric of society.”

Because they occur in public spaces, these shrines are both commemorative (dedicated to sustaining the memory of individuals and events) and performative (meant to “make something happen”—to materially transform the space of the event, the significance of event, and anyone who interacts with the site). Moreover, as Erika Doss argues, spontaneous shrines “are often aggressively physical entities”—creating assemblages of objects that seem to reach out from the site to demand public recognition and negotiation by passers-by. These shrines are also memory spaces made of material objects brought into relation with each other and with those who encounter them while being located in a unique space: at the site of a particular automobile crash, which is usually in the liminal space of the public right-of-way.

This last point is critical to understanding roadside shrines because they contain memory in three main ways—emplacement, enclosure, and management—and all of these take shape only within a particular spatial location. First, crash shrines emplace memory in a certain unique spatial location, the site of the crash itself (see Figure 1). Here, contained means located “here” versus “there”. Because these crash shrines are located in public spaces, they are usually set off from their surroundings in some way. Thus they also carve out a space for themselves to enclose memory into an “inside” separated from an “outside” (see Figure 2). Here, contained means inside a container. Finally, once enclosed and emplaced, memory spaces and objects allow shrine builders and visitors to manage memory over time by adding, moving, removing, or replacing things within the site, and even revising its overall design (see Figures 3-4). Here contained means maintained, extended, revised, or contested as the site is negotiated over time.

The first two of these processes are spatial and the third is temporal. How these three processes interact at particular sites is what gives each one its distinct identity. In the following analysis, there is evidence of all three of these processes. Here I am focused primarily on the latter temporal dimension of managing sites once they have been established.
Presenting absence

While roadside shrines sometimes include debris from the crash in their form, very few contain any explicit mention of the crash itself. This suggests that they are not about remembering a concretely-located event or time contained in the past, but rather about performing a continuing memory in the present. These shrines assert and actually materialise an ongoing social presence for the person who is “no longer with us” in body, but is very much present in proxy form in the shrine. Clearly, there is a spiritual and theological dimension to this, and different shrines perform different conceptions of the afterlife. However all seem to materialise a belief that it is a portal through which the living can communicate with the dead as if they are still present.

Indeed, a shrine is a technology for making sure that this presence is maintained publicly. Photographs and objects are central to this mediation, and sometimes the “speaking” to the dead is represented in writing inscribed onto
photographs and objects. When people leave messages at shrines they often speak directly to the dead from first-person (“I” or “we”) to second-person (“you”). They do so using the present tense and future tense (“I miss you”, “I will miss you”, “We will never forget you”), but hardly ever using the past tense (see Figure 5).

These speech acts project an ongoing presence for the victim, materialising a continuing relationship between mourners and mourned through the shrine. However in serving this very function for the people who use the shrines this way in full view of strangers—by asserting the continued presence of the dead through actively performing commemoration—roadside crash shrines ensure that those who suddenly die biologically do not also suddenly die socially.

Crash shrines share this with other vernacular sites of memory in contemporary culture, where the cultural line between life and death is becoming increasingly blurred. In Death, Memory, & Material Culture, Elizabeth Hallam and Jenny Hockey argue that material memory objects, sites, and practices are not only commemorations of loss but “attempts to counter loss caused by death, making connections with the absent individuals and bringing them into the present”.12 Analysing elaborately built and maintained gravesites that are similar in some respects to roadside shrines, they argue that actively maintained memorial sites work to “sustain the dead as socially living persons”. Such sites also provide “a means to maintain a physical proximity with the deceased—a sense of ‘being with’ a particular person now, rather than simply recalling what has passed”.13

The many objects contained within shrines play a central role in this process of keeping absent people present. As Margaret Gibson argues, “people grieve with and through objects”, where the “transitional nature of corporeal existence is both compensated for and replaced by representations and objects” that are used to help people mourn.14 This sense of a memory/space as a location for ongoing “being with” the dead is particularly pronounced at roadside shrines, which augment the
gravesite with a separate site in the public roadscape that commemorates the place where the deceased not only died, but was *last alive*.\textsuperscript{15}

**Transferred lives**

As Jay Winter has written about war memorials, public commemoration at sites of memory satisfies and materialises a need to remember, but even sites with the power of the state mobilised behind them tend towards dissolution: “When that need (to commemorate a certain event important to a public) vanishes, so does the glue that holds together the social practice of commemoration. Then collective memories diminish and sites of memory decompose or simply fade into the landscape”.\textsuperscript{16} Like other memorial spaces and structures, roadside shrines have a life-cycle: they are created, they live, and eventually they will die. However they do not do so symmetrically. Most shrines disappear shortly after they appear, either because they are removed to comply with legal restrictions or because they are simply no longer used.

A shrine with staying power prolongs its existence because it is continually renewed—actively maintained by friends and family members. They visit the sites and re-decorate them on holidays, as well as the victim’s birthday and significant days in their familial lives such as wedding anniversaries. Some sites sustain central elements across these revisions while removing the older objects, while others simply add to the existing objects, sometimes re-arranging them. At some sites there is a coherent and clean revision, while at others, the collection grows and contracts from the centre, often spilling out of the defined space of the shrine.
At these long-standing shrines, the ongoing temporal production of space-bound memory asserts a certain kind of indefinitely accumulating time, where the shrine takes on a life of its own through the continually unfolding production of space. This indicates that the evolving life of the shrine is predicated on a kind of transference between the life of the victim and the life of the shrine. At some shrines, the transference of life to a material object is made even more literal when a plant is grown at the site. If it is cared for long enough to be established, it will develop over time, taking the place of the person whose life is now separated from time.


Figure 9. New Mexico State Highway 518, west of Sipapu, New Mexico, U.S., 2010. Photo by author.

Each crash shrine materialises not only the memory of crash victims, but also its own history as a site of memory. Its location on the roadside contributes to its specific spatio-temporal constraints within these histories. Crash shrines are vernacular cultural productions inserted into a space officially produced by the state on behalf of the public. Unlike domestic in-home shrines, they are not only subject to regulation by the state and to vandalism, but are also literally “outside”. They are therefore subject to the specific climate and weather phenomena encountered on the roadside. Some shrines will accumulate objects for years and
then suddenly disappear. Sometimes there is also material evidence of the crash itself left behind in the form of tree scars and bent guardrails and crash debris, but no evidence of the shrine’s mediation of the crash, as it no longer exists. Other sites materialise signs of slow dispersal and decay.

My first response to such decay—a material reminder of the physical and social death of the persons commemorated at these sites—was to feel melancholy at the evident loss. Indeed, it is hard to describe these sites in neutral terms in a way that does not put a value on the change. The words that come to mind are decayed, abandoned, neglected, incoherent, dispersed, messy, toppled, dirty, broken, faded. Certainly the mirroring of a body’s dissolution in the decay of objects at a shrine is poignant. However what exactly is lost when a roadside shrine dies in public? If such a process of dissolution were invisible, or located in private space, it would have no claim on a public. Because it happens in a public space, however, the death of a long-standing shrine does something else.

If a shrine transfers the life of the victim to itself, ensuring that it will live past the victim, it not only literally re-places them in social space, but also compensates for their lost future as a social entity. While the victim will no longer celebrate new birthdays, anniversaries, and holidays, the shrine does. As living memory/ space, the shrine is a means of replacing the interrupted life with a new life that is allowed to take its course as the victim’s life was expected to before it was cut short by the crash. This applies not only to the shrine’s life, but also to its death. While the victim’s life was ended prematurely, without the possibility of living until the “natural” processes of bodily decay prevail, the shrine is allowed that privilege too. It spends its everyday life standing there in the wind and the sun and the rain, doing its job, like a person, living its life instead of having its life ended by a tragic and untimely death.
Thus, one of the things shrines do as memory forms is to re-create the lost body’s ability to live long enough to die of natural causes. Sometimes this fact is so evident that it is uncanny, as in the case of a shrine north of Albuquerque, New Mexico (see Figures 12-13). The site has featured a stuffed cartoon Tasmanian devil at least since I took the first picture in 2006, where he appears new. In 2010, I photographed the site again and ‘TAZ’ has a new friend and graying eyebrows. Clearly, the iconic and anthropomorphic aspects of these objects contribute to the uncanny feeling. It is even more pronounced when, as in another shrine from New Mexico, the central figure at the site takes on human form (see Figures 14-15).
Making memory public

A shrine is not only a living memory of someone lost—an active attempt to keep the memory of the past loss present and alive in the public sphere—but also a talking-back to that death itself through material means. This is an assertion not of the memory of absence but of presence: they are still here, included socially in the motoring public that lives on and is driving past every day. In short, roadside crash shrines open up collective spaces for remembering individual road traumas that assert an ongoing social presence of lost drivers, passengers, and others killed in automobile accidents.

However scholars working on roadside shrines have focused more on the producers and direct users of crash shrines and have not adequately theorised or explained their wider collectivising functions. For instance, Catherine Collins and Alexandra Opie argue that they provide a space for working-through the violent deaths that occur. This creates an orderly inversion of “the chaos of traumatic memory and grief”, giving the people who build and maintain shrines a sense of agency in the face of traumatic loss. 19

This is also a central claim of Jennifer Clark and Majella Franzmann, who see roadside shrines as a way for mourners to claim an “authority from grief” in the public sphere.20 This is certainly a primary function of any roadside shrine. However while these other scholars have shown how shrines give the people who build them agency, I contend that they have their own agency once they are built and this has everything to do with how they work as collective memory forms. Simply put, shrines can be said to have agency because they seem to be alive there on the roadside while they have all sorts of things “done to them”. They are built, maintained, revised, contested and removed, but they also do something in the public sphere as they live their lives on the roadside.

That “doing something” is what I explore by way of conclusion. In Stuff, Daniel Miller argues that material culture is not simply a system of “stuff” but one where people and stuff “mutually constitute each other” within a dialectic between subject and object: where “objects make us, as part of the very same process by which we make them”.21 I hope it has become clear that I share Miller’s conception of material objects and formations as locations for cultural work and not only containers of cultural work. The question then is: precisely how does this mutually constitutive cultural work work at crash shrines?

I have been arguing that a shrine transfers the life of the lost victim onto itself and I would like to be more precise about that claim. Thus far, my use of the term “transference” has implied a simple act of transferring something from one thing or state of being into another, but it also has a much more specific meaning within psychoanalytic theory, particularly within what is called object relations theory. Recently, scholars in the humanities and social sciences have been applying this psychoanalytic concept to a more literal kind of “object relations” between people and objects within material culture.
Within object-relations and relational psychoanalytic theoretical models, transference describes a particular therapeutic situation. When a patient’s memory or experience is revived in a therapeutic session, an earlier experience is experienced as “in process” in the present, and the earlier person is replaced by the therapist who is projected upon as a therapeutic “object”. In transference, the subject treats the object as if the object is equivalent to the subject’s image of the object, erasing difference through what is called “projective identification”. However transference refers to more than projection. It is, as Peter Redman argues, “a process of unconscious communication firmly located in the present and within a relational field”, where transference dynamics “are simultaneously internal and shared, felt as belonging inside a particular individual while having no clear home in any single person”.  

The dynamic is radically uncontained—“a flow rather than a location” where “the ‘inner’ always has the ‘outer’ present within it (and vice versa) such that the boundaries between inside and outside are fundamentally blurred and unstable”. This aligns the concept squarely with current theories of intersubjectivity within material culture, which emphasise not only the agency and “excessiveness” of objects, but also the kind of interpenetration of self and object contained by the dynamic of transference. Thus transference is a crucial process to engage in explaining how individual and collective memories interplay at particular memory/spaces.

Roadside shrines clearly are transference objects, but they are also comprised of transference objects. As Margaret Gibson argues, “Through death, the most mundane objects can rise in symbolic, emotional and mnemonic value, sometimes outweighing all other measures of value—particularly the economic”. By engaging in transference and investing in things, shrine builders transform everyday mass-produced objects (such as teddy bears, plastic flowers, and balloons) into magical objects capable of affect. It is exactly this micro-process of transference that gives shrines their agency within the larger public sphere as well, where both the victim and the shrine builders are generally unknown to drive-by witnesses. If it were not for the initial transference of affect accomplished by shrine builders a shrine would be inert—a dead collection of stuff on the side of the road with no claim on the rest of us—but it is anything but inert.

A crash shrine materialises the process of investment in things, but it also renders them affective to those who witness the shrines as strangers. When you drive by one and notice it, you are brought into its web of transference. It can “trigger” your own memories of road trauma. It can “remind” you of other shrines you have seen. It can “make” you slow down. It can “cause” you to feel empathy. Literally, the shrine “does nothing”, but nonetheless, things happen.

This is what I mean by saying that crash shrines “do something”. What they do is create a public that knows trauma. They depend on the agency of others to give them their agency. By performing a specific, very local, site of memory in a public space—by living and dying on the roadside at the same place where the person they commemorate was lost—they materialise a wider memory/ space as well. This
is a space for secondary witnessing of the everyday traumas embedded within a culture that lives in and through automobiles.

Created as transference objects for the bereaved, crash shrines live and die also as transference objects for anonymous drivers as well. They encounter shrines without knowing the people memorialised, without being “inside” the micro-public who maintain a social presence for the victim by commemorating a specific life lost, but being contained inside a different public: a motoring public made aware of lost fellow drivers. Seen this way, the mourning and warning functions of shrines converge: crash shrines do important work not only for the individuals who mourn the loss of their loved ones, but also for the larger collective. This is not only as a warning, but as an implicit assertion of affiliation—an assertion that their memory is our memory.

Endnotes


5Radstone and Schwarz, “Mapping Memory,” 2.

Throughout, I am committed to creating what W.J.T. Mitchell calls an “image-text” where my words and photographs carry the argument through different


7 Hallam and Hockey, *Death, Memory & Material Culture*, 152.


11 Here I am referring to a more general sense of ‘site of memory’ than Pierre Nora’s, which is too entangled with the nation as public to apply to radically localised roadside shrines. Cf. Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*,” *Representations* 26 (1989).

12 In both pictures, the photo in the frame above ‘TAZ’ is faded beyond recognition, indicating a site history even longer than I picture here.


14 Jennifer Clark and Majella Franzmann, “Authority From Grief.”


17 Redman, “Affect Revisited,” 63.

18 See especially Knappett, *Thinking Through Material Culture*.

19 Gibson, “Melancholy Objects,” 292.
**Bibliography**


**Biographical note**

Robert M. Bednar is Associate Professor and Chair of Communication Studies at Southwestern University in Georgetown, Texas, where he teaches media studies, visual communication, and cultural studies. His work as an analyst, photographer, and theorist of critical visual communication focuses on the ways that people perform identities visually, materially, and spatially in public landscapes. The paper included here is part of his current book project titled *Road Scars: Trauma, Memory, and Automobility* which explores the visual, material, and spatial dimensions of roadside crash shrines as they are situated in the roadscape and within the discourse of automobility in the contemporary U.S.

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