Remembering Katyn: Mourning, Memory, and National Identity

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Abstract

This article examines the connection between mourning, memory, and national identity in Poland after World War II, with specific reference to the Katyn Massacre. In 1940, approximately 22,000 Polish citizens were executed by the Soviet secret police under Stalin’s orders, and then buried in mass graves. In 1943, German soldiers discovered one of the graves in the Katyn Forest. Stalin denied responsibility for the massacre and accused the Germans of committing the crime. Successive Soviet governments denied culpability for the Katyn massacre until documents that proved Soviet guilt were released under Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990, and then Boris Yeltsin in 1992. Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s work on mourning, this article argues that mourning and historical memory are integral to recreating a sense of national identity after traumatic events. Commemorations and memorials are often instrumental in aiding this memory work. In post-World War II Poland, however, Soviet policy dictated which historical memories could be told. Memorials were used to reinforce the Soviet narrative of Katyn, silencing the public work of mourning and memory for the relatives of the victims.

Keywords: Katyn massacre, mourning, memory, national identity, Derrida
Introduction

This article examines the role of historical memory and national identity in Poland after World War II, with specific reference to the Katyn Massacre of 1940. Drawing on French philosopher, Jacques Derrida’s, work on mourning this article suggests that mourning and memory are integral to recreating a national identity after traumatic events. One of the ways nations restructure national identity after these traumas is via public commemoration and memorials. While each individual will have their own experiences, these communal mourning rituals serve as a place in which these memories can be shared and are used to create new narratives about national identity.¹ This was not possible in post-World War II Poland, however, as the newly instated communist government sought to control the types of stories that could be told. The establishment of several censorship agencies helped to silence any narratives which conflicted with the Soviet version of history. Katyn was a particularly taboo subject in communist Poland. To even mention the word in public was a punishable offence, so relatives of the victims were forced to mourn in private. This also meant that there could be no shared historical memory of the event, as the Soviet government sought to erase the crime from historical memory and public discourse.

Katyn

The word “Katyn” has come to represent the massacre of approximately 22,000 Polish men (and one woman) comprising of generals, army officers, policemen, teachers, priests, rabbis, and doctors, taken prisoner by the Soviet secret police (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs or NKVD) in the spring of 1939. The prisoners were kept in three separate concentration camps at Kozelsk, Ostashkov, and Starobelsk. In 1940, Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, ordered the execution of the prisoners. They were shot in the back of the head and buried in various locations in Russia and the Ukraine as part of his attempt to implement “class cleansing” in Poland. The prisoners being held at Kozelsk were buried in mass graves in the Katyn Forest, and those from Ostashkov in Miednoye, and from Starobelsk were in Kharkov. The graves at Katyn were discovered by German soldiers in 1943 and, as a result, “Katyn” now refers to all the massacres.

The first public mention of the Katyn graves was made by the German news agency, Trans-Ocean, on 11 April 1943. The German government publicly announced the discovery of the graves and accused the Soviets of mass murder. The following day this was countered by a pro-Soviet, Polish language broadcast from Moscow which claimed the accusations were German propaganda. British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and U.S. President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, accepted Stalin’s claim that the German accusations were false and supported his decision to set up a special Soviet commission for the investigation of the site.
From then on, successive Soviet governments continued to deny responsibility for the Katyn massacre until 1990, when documents released under Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR, confirmed Soviet guilt.

The end of the World War II marked the beginning of a new political regime in Poland. Stalin retained control over the country, and swiftly instituted a Polish communist government. In order to control communication throughout the country, the Polish communists implemented a sophisticated censorship authority. Katyn became a forbidden topic within this political climate. The newly instated censorship agencies suppressed all references to Katyn in published texts, and merely mentioning the atrocity risked reprisal. Relatives of the Katyn victims were unable to speak publicly about the cause of their deaths for fear of retribution.

Control of the issue continued in this vein for the life of the Polish Communist Party. However, after the death of Stalin and the dissolution of Stalinist communism in 1957, individuals were no longer repressed for private political discussion as they were in the early days of the party. The continued suppression of the event meant that those who had relatives buried in Miednoye or Kharkov did not learn the fate of their loved ones until 1990, when Gorbachev disclosed the whereabouts of the mass graves at Ostashkov and Kharkov.

**Historical memory and national identity**

In her book, *The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts After Communism*, journalist, Tina Rosenberg, highlights the importance of historical memory for the Poles. She attributes this to the fact that, throughout history, Poland’s borders have “fluctuated so wildly that for decades at a time the country disappeared from the map and existed solely in the minds of the Poles”. Rosenberg suggests that they have a “keen sense that having no geography, history must take its place”. Without a fixed geographical location in which to create collective memories, narratives about the past needed to be negotiated in this abstract memory space. National identity is symbolic, not geographic. We see evidence of this on the home page of the Institute of National Remembrance–Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (IPN) website. Established in Poland in 1988, the IPN was created to investigate “issues which are considered essential to the legislative power in Poland”, namely, the preservation of historical memory and the investigation of crimes committed against the Polish nation during the period 1939–1989.

A quote on the Institute’s website reads “Our History Creates Our Identity”. This reiterates the idea that national identity is informed by the past, and by the retelling of historical narratives. Anna Maria Orla-Bukowska, a social anthropologist writing on memory and identity in post-war Poland, argues that “it is still World War II which weighs heaviest on and delineates Polish national memory”. She suggests that Polish ways of remembering this war demonstrate “how Polish historical memory connects with its social identity”, because during
World War II “a social and spiritual community fell apart catastrophically”.

The entire “symbolic universe” of Poland was destroyed: the Polish army, the government, the landscape and, of course, many families were split apart due to deportation, death, or migration. It is this destruction of so many symbols of Polish culture which seems to drive narratives about national identity. Because so much was lost, there is a need to re-remember historical narratives in order to recreate Polish national identity.

In their study of the memorialisation process as it pertains to identity formation in post-totalitarian societies, Benjamin Forest, Juliet Johnson, and Karen Till suggest that for societies undergoing political transition, “place-making and memory processes are significant spatial practices through which the national past is reconstructed and through which political and social change may be negotiated.” That is, the representation of national identity and historical narratives requires participation in public spaces. For societies transitioning from an oppressive regime, such as totalitarianism, this process is particularly useful as it provides a shared space in which memories about the past can be acknowledged, and new memories and histories can be reconstructed. The case of Katyn is a unique case study in Polish World War II history because there was no public space in which the Polish people could negotiate mourning and national identity.

As Ewa M. Thompson, a research professor in Slavic studies, points out, between 1939 and 1989 there was “no freedom to remember” in Poland. The Soviet government attempted to erase all traces of the crime in public memory by obliterating references to Katyn on maps and in official reference works. As noted earlier, government censorship agencies suppressed all mention of the event, preventing children of the Katyn victims from speaking publicly about the cause of their father’s deaths. For many Poles then, Katyn became “a family story” and narratives about the Katyn victims were only told within the home. Thompson argues that this “denial of access to memory ... was destructive of Polish political culture”. Families of the victims were also denied access to rituals of mourning. They were not allowed to openly commemorate the death of their loved ones, while the families of those officers buried in Miednoye and Kharkov had no confirmation of their fate or where they were buried. This denial of a culture of mourning and commemoration was equally destructive to identity, both national and individual.

**Mourning**

Like memory, mourning is a communal practice. Derrida suggests that, “There is no culture without a cult of ancestors, a ritualization of mourning and sacrifice, institutional places and modes of burial.” There can be no community that is not somehow haunted by death. While the meaning of death may change from one culture to the next, each one has its own culture of death, mourning rituals,
Remembering Katyn: Mourning, Memory, and National Identity — Vanessa Fredericks

commemorative practices, and funerary customs. In Polish culture, there is a long history of communal mourning, the origins of which can be traced back to the Romantic era. For the families of the Katyn victims, this culture of mourning was silenced for 50 years after the event. Staniswava Soyova, whose father, Ignacy Dec, died at Katyn stresses that, “The worst was the silence, the prohibition against speaking openly of their death, of a dignified burial, for half a century. It was forbidden even to visit the places of execution.” For Soyova, this denial of mourning is the worst of the injustices done to the Polish nation. The denial of memory through mourning is, in a sense, a denial of (Polish) national identity.

Contemporary narratives on mourning owe much to the father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. For Freud, normal mourning is a process by which the mourner must detach themselves from the lost object and move on. Normal mourning comes to an end and the libido becomes “free” as long as it is able to “replace the lost objects that are, where possible, equally precious, or with still more precious new ones”. For Freud, mourning is an enclosed, internalised memory, and successful mourning entails finding a substitute for the other. For Derrida, however, the dead are irreplaceable, and the death of the other is a call to responsibility. In Memoires for Paul De Man (1986), a series of lectures Derrida wrote after the death of his friend literary critic, Paul De Man, he draws on De Man’s idea of gedachtnis (memory) as a thinking, externalising memory and re-conceptualises mourning as a future-oriented memory: The memory that we are considering here is not essentially oriented toward the past, toward a past present deemed to have really and previously existed. Memory stays with traces, in order to “preserve” them, but traces of a past that has never been present, traces which themselves never occupy the form of presence and always remain, as it were, to come—come from the future, from there to come.

Memory appears in the present as a trace of the past, but it belongs in neither. Memory belongs in the “to come” that can never be presented. For Freud, mourning is an “interiorising memory”. Derrida, on the other hand, presents mourning as “an externalising memory that is future-oriented”. Freud’s model of mourning involves detachment from the lost object, replacement, and moving on. The legacy of this model is evident in contemporary narratives about grief. It is commonplace to talk about “healing” or “moving on”, which is essentially what Freud’s model of mourning suggests. A variation of this model is also commonly applied to traumatic events in history. Tina Rosenberg, for example, proposes that nations “need to face up to and understand traumatic events before they can put them aside and move on”. While Freud’s model of mourning promises finality, for Derrida, the work of mourning does not end. In The Work of Mourning, he presents mourning as an ethical responsibility that the living owes the dead. This responsibility is ongoing; the mourner does not renounce their memories of the dead as Freud proposes.

The relatives of the Katyn victims were, in a sense, forced to renounce their memories of the dead as in Freudian mourning. They were prevented from
speaking about the deaths of the Katyn victims due to the censorship laws that dictated how the event could be discussed. For Derrida, mourning also includes a political dimension; he once claimed that there can be no politics without the time and space of mourning. Derridean mourning is not only an ethical response to the death of a loved one; it is an ethical political response to traumatic events. His interpretation of mourning as an ethical responsibility that the living owes the dead highlights the importance of mourning and remembering the Katyn victims, as well as victims of other atrocities, as a gift to the future.

Memorials and monuments

Orla-Bukowska suggests that one way in which communities restructure identities after traumatic experiences is to organise the new identity “around specific symbolic axes such as time and space, and via heroes, museums, monuments, and the like”. The erection of monuments has been central to Polish ways of remembering. In the post-war years, however, the Soviet version of Katyn became enshrined not only in Soviet history books and encyclopaedias, but also in monuments. While monuments which commemorated the struggle against the Nazis were allowed, Soviet crimes in Poland remained a taboo subject. The function of these monuments was to “forget” as opposed to commemorate or remember. They were informed by what French philosopher, Jean-François Lyotard, would call a “politics of forgetting”.

One particular monument to the Polish victims was constructed at the burial site at Katyn in the late 1940s, to be replaced by a new one in the early 1960s. The first one, erected around 1945 read: “Here are buried the prisoner officers of the Polish Army murdered in terrible torments by the German-Fascist occupiers in the fall of 1941.” Another inscription, noted some 30 years later read: “Here rest the remains of Polish officers, prisoners of war bestially martyred by the German-Fascist occupiers of in the fall of 1941.” This monument was used to reinforce the Soviet narrative regarding German guilt. As late as 1981, members of the Solidarity movement created a memorial which simply said: “Katyn, 1940”. Even though there was no mention of the NKVD, the police removed it. Later, the Polish government, on cue from Moscow, replaced it with another memorial reiterating the Soviet version of events. This one said: “To the Polish soldiers—victims of Hitlerite fascism—reposing in the soil of Katyn.” Instead of being used to commemorate and mourn the victims of Katyn, these monuments were used to reinscribe Soviet myths about the massacre and rewrite historical memory.

Soviet censorship and concealment of the issue of Katyn was far-reaching. The Soviets sought to control how the event was discussed even outside the Soviet Block. In 1969, the Soviet government erected a memorial to people murdered by the Germans in a Belorussian village near Minks named Khatyn. There was no particular significance for choosing this site; it was one of thousands of Belorussian villages the Germans had destroyed. While in Russian and Belorussian,
Katyn and Khatyn are spelled and pronounced differently, in English they look and sound alike. When President Nixon visited the USSR in July 1974, he visited the Khatyn memorial. Sensing that the Soviets were exploiting the visit for propaganda purposes, *The New York Times* headlined its coverage of the tour: “Nixon sees Khatyn, a Soviet Memorial, Not Katyn Forest”.

George Sanford, a political scientist who specialises in Polish and Eastern European studies, suggests that the Soviets attempted to confuse Khatyn with Katyn in Western minds. However, by this stage, attempts to control historical memory in the West were futile. In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, Katyn became a heated topic in the West after the publication of a few important books. In London, on October 1971, the Katyn Memorial Fund came into being and pledged to erect a memorial in London to honour the men who were murdered “because they were the faithful sons of the gallant Polish nation”. After a long drawn-out political process, it was decided that the memorial would be built at Gunnersbury Cemetery in West London, and on 18 September 1976, the memorial was unveiled. Louis Fitzgibbon, the secretary of the memorial fund, explains the importance of the monument:

> It is necessary to honour the dead and to perpetuate their memory, to bring some solace to the widows of these victims, their surviving relatives, brother officers and men; to constitute a lasting tribute to the sufferings of Poland in the case of Freedom; to proclaim the truth and symbolise the struggle for justice not yet achieved, to mark an event in history which so many have for so long conspired to erase.

For Fitzgibbon, this memorial is more than just a place that the London Poles can come to commemorate and mourn. This memorial symbolises Poland’s struggle for freedom, and is a necessary requirement for reinscribing the memory of this event within the context of Polish historical narratives. In a speech given at the unveiling of the memorial it was said: “we are here not only to mourn those Poles who died, defenceless and still defiant. We are here to celebrate the invincibility of that spirit of Poland for whom they died. This is not simply a memorial to the dead past. It is a pledge to the living future”.

This memorial is not simply about memory, or about mourning. It is about maintaining narratives about the past, and highlighting the importance of historical memory as it pertains to narratives about national identity. In a way, this memorial serves as an externalising memory that honours the past as a gift to the future.

**Memorialising the event after 1990**

In 1988, the media reform that accompanied Mikhail Gorbachev’s *glasnost* (open discussion) policy, and the ensuing public discussion of Stalinist crimes in the USSR, also led to the relaxation of censorship in Poland. This resulted in growing pressure for the facts on Katyn. *Glasnost* led to the opening of some state archives to three Russian historians (Yuri Zoria, Valentina Parsadonova, and
Natalia Lebedeva), who had a significant impact on the uncovering of the truth about Katyn. In 1989, they found previously unknown documents on the Polish prisoners of war including archival materials on those held in the three camps which corresponded with the names of the dead officers compiled by the Germans in 1943. In April 1990, Gorbachev released the NKVD lists of Polish prisoners and some accompanying documents, thus revealing that the Soviet secret police were responsible for the massacres. This revelation came 50 years after the event. In October 1992, Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, released the remainder of the documents.

Bożena Łojek, who lost her father at Katyn and founded the Warsaw Katyn Families Association, noted that the “possibility of achieving a measure of justice within the legal-judicial framework, passed away for good in the mid-1990s”. The fight for justice was replaced with a “campaign to commemorate the massacre through appropriate monuments at the burial sites as well as in cemeteries and churches”. In 1994, Boris Yeltsin objected to the Poles’ demands for an apology and for compensation for the victims, although he did agree that a memorial should be built at Katyn. This memorial would be created to include all the innocent victims of totalitarianism and Nazism within the framework, of which there should be a dignified memorial to the Polish officers.

The Soviet version of events became so embedded in Russian historical memory that there was still reluctance to acknowledge the injustice done to the Poles in the name of Soviet communism. A Polish-Russian agreement was signed in 1994, in which the Poles agreed to maintain Russian war graves in Poland and vice versa, and a Polish-Ukrainian agreement was signed which led to the opening of three cemeteries in 2000 at Kharkov, Katyn, and Miednoye (the burial sites of the executed officers).

The importance of being able to visit the mass graves is highlighted by Ewa Leśnik whose father was buried at Katyn. She says, “For me the necropolis in Katyn Forest, Kharkov and Miednoye are components in the re-attainment of Polish spiritual sovereignty”. She is thus alluding to the fact that Polish mourning rituals are informed by a Catholic discourse. Brian Porter, a Polish-American historian, argues that, “It is almost universally accepted, in English as well as Polish language texts, that Catholicism in Poland ‘is a question of national identity.’” It is therefore important not just to be able to visit the graves as sites for remembrance and shared memory, but to be able to partake in mourning rituals specific to Polish Catholicism (such as All Souls’ Day).

Leśnik quotes from a publication of the Council for the Preservation of the Memory of Struggle and Suffering: “Historical memory does not mean historical justice. It is, however, a condition for the normalization of social and national life. The collective cemeteries are ‘our contact with an undying past’.” Leśnik emphasises that while memory is not the same thing as justice, historical memory is what sustains national identity after a traumatic event such as Katyn, and it is mourning which provides a significant connection with the past. Thompson suggests that, “memories start with the place where the event giving rise to
While it is important that the Poles are now able to visit the places of burial, it is interesting to note that after the collapse of Soviet communism, a series of monuments dedicated to the victims of Katyn have not only been placed throughout Poland, but the world. There are now monuments in Toronto, Johannesburg, Baltimore, Canberra, and Budapest (to name a few).

Thompson suggests that this “indicates that the Katyn trauma has sunk deeply into the collective memory”. She notes, perhaps ironically, that “of all the murders of Poles by the Soviets this one is best remembered”. Despite the efforts to erase the crime from Poland’s official history, Katyn “could not be erased from historical memory”. As Derrida tells us in *Memoires for Paul de Man*, memory stays with traces in order to preserve them, traces of a past which always remain to come. While public spaces were used by the Soviet government to rewrite historical narratives, the trace of the event remained not only in the memory of individual Poles, but also in public memory, as these memorials demonstrate.

**Conclusion**

The role of commemoration in restructuring historical narratives and national identity after traumatic events is crucial. In post-World War II Poland, this practice was prevented by Soviet control of the Katyn story in historical narratives and public memorials. This article has drawn on Derrida’s work on mourning to highlight the importance of mourning rituals to this memory work. Derridean mourning differs from Freud in that the work of mourning does not end by finding a replacement for the lost other. It involves a continued conversation with the other that has passed. This is essentially a work of responsibility and responsivity. After 50 years of silence, the Poles are now able to negotiate national identity via commemoration and memorials as a future-oriented dialogue with the dead. The significance of this work of memory is articulated by Derrida who once wrote, “You must answer for the dead, you must respond to them here and now.”

**Endnotes**

1See, for example, Paul Connerton’s study of the ways collective memories are sustained by ritual performance. Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
4Wesley Adamczyk in Teresa Kaczorowska, *Children of the Katyn Massacre: Accounts of Life After the 1940 Soviet Murder of Polish POWs*, trans. Frank Kujawinski

5For example, a court in Łódź sentenced film student, Zofia Dwornik, to a year in prison in 1951 for telling her friends that the NKVD had murdered her father and her brother-in-law who were prisoners in Kozelsk. George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 208.


8Rosenberg, The Haunted Land, xvi.


17Fisher, “Stalin’s Killing Field,” 64.

18Adamcyk in Kaczorowska, Children of the Katyn Massacre, 4.


20Thompson, “Ways of Remembering,” 2.


22Philosopher, Peter Steeves, for example, has argued that mourning is always collective, always communal: “To be sad is to be within a community of those who recognize sadness and who are capable of echoing it back to us, tear for tear.” Peter Steeves, “There Shall Be No Name,” Mosaic 40(2), (2007), 190.


Cited in Kaczorowska, *Children of the Katyn Massacre*, 150.


Freud writes, “We know that mourning, however painful it may be, comes to an end of its own accord,” in Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 199.


Cienciala et al., *Katyn*, 241.


Cienciala et al., *Katyn*, 242.

Cienciala et al., *Katyn*, 241.

Fisher, “Stalin’s Killing Field,” 64.

Fisher, “Stalin’s Killing Field,” 64.


The speech was delivered by Lord St. Oswald, a British soldier and conservative politician.


Cienciala et al., *Katyn*, 249-50.

Cienciala et al., *Katyn*, 250.


Cienciala et al., *Katyn*, 257.

Cienciala et al., *Katyn*, 258.

Cited in Kaczmukowska, *Children of the Katyn Massacre*, 90.


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Biographical note

Vanessa Fredericks is a PhD candidate in the department of Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in Australia. The focus of her research is the construction of Polish historical narratives during and after World War II, specifically how they pertain to the issues of mourning, memory, national identity, martyrdom, justice, and forgiveness.

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